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I. Introduction * 
1) Uberseering and the "Obsolescence of Traditional Private International Law" 
On November 5, 2002, the European Court of Justice rendered its decision in 
Uberseering. 1 Uberseering was a company originally incorporated in the Netherlands, 
which had later transferred its effective seat of administration to Germany. Under German 
law, the effective seat determines the law applicable to a company. Thus, Uberseering was 
now a German company that was not in compliance with German company law and thus 
lacked legal personality. Arguably, the company therefore had no locus standi to bring suit 
before German courts. The Court of Justice held that this violated the Treaty and that 
Germany was obliged to grant locus standi. 2 
This was the third time that the Court dealt with the legal personality of companies 
acting in a state different from that of their incorporation. 3 In its Daily Mail decision in 
1988,4 the Court had held that "unlike natural persons, companies are creatures of the law 
and, in the present state of Community law, creatures of national law. They exist only by 
virtue of the varying national legislation which determines their incorporation and 
functioning."s Consequently, it allowed the United Kingdom to condition the news-
paper's change of its corporate seat to the Netherlands on the satisfaction of its tax liability 
in the u.K. In 1999, the Court rendered its CentlVs decision. 6 Two Danish citizens, in 
order to avoid the high registration costs under Danish law, had established a private 
Limited Company in England, Centros Ltd (with only nominal minimum capital which 
was never paid) and set up a subsidiary in Copenhagen. They were only interested in the 
subsidiary. Centros Ltd itself never became active and had no connection to England and 
Wales other than the incorporation. Therefore, Denmark wanted to treat the subsidiary as a 
Danish company, and refused registration unless the fees for Danish companies had been 
paid. The European Court of Justice ordered the Danish authorities to register the 
subsidiary, arguing that Centros Ltd had been incorporated legally under u.K. law, and 
the EC Treaty gave companies a right to form branches in other member states. The earlier 
Daily Mail judgment was not mentioned. 
* 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
The text is essentially in the fonn in which it was submitted in the spring of 2003; only some newer 
references have been added. 
Judgment of Nov II, 2002, Case C-208/00, Uberseering BV v. Nordic Construction Company 
Baumanagement GmbH (NCC), [2002] E.C.R. 
Before the Court of Justice decided Uberseering, the Gennan Bundesgerichtshof held that foreign 
companies with an effective seat in Gennany had locus standi: Bundesgerichtshof, July 1,2002,2002 
Neue Juristische Wochenschrift (NJW) 3539 = 23 Praxis des Internationalen Privatrechts (IPRax) 62, 
note Kindler p. 41; cf. Stefan Leible & Jochen Hoffmann, Vom "Nullum" zur Personengesellschaft 
Die Metamorphose der Scheinauslandsgesellschaft im deutschen Recht, 55 Der Betrieb (DB), 2203 
(2002). 
A fourth case is Case C-167/01, Kamer van Koophandel en Fabrieken voor Amsterdam v. Inspire Art 
Ltd, [2003] E.C.R. 10155. 
Judgment of Sep 29, 1988, Case C-81187, The Queen v. Daily Mail and General Trust pic, [1988] 
E.C.R. 5483. 
Id., at no. 19. 
Judgment of March 9, 1999, Case C-212/97, Centros Ltd. V. Ehvers- og Seiskabsstryelsen, [1999] 
E.C.R. 1-1459. 
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All three decisions seem to concern an old problem of private international law 7 -
whether the law applicable to a company should be the law of its effective seat (seat 
principle) or that of its incorporation (incorporation principle).8 Indeed, academics in 
private international law took each of the Court's decisions as deciding this dispute one 
way or the other. Daily Mail was understood to mean that member states were essentially 
free to apply one principle or the other: 9 The United Kingdom applied the incorporation 
principle, but other states were free to apply the seat principle. This interpretation received 
a blow by the Centros decision, which suddenly seemed to hold that European law 
required member states to accept the incorporation principle. After all, Denmark was 
forced to recognize Centros Ltd. as a u.K. company, even though its effective seat was in 
Denmark. The Court of Justice was heavily criticized because it had not mentioned the 
Daily Mail decision, and had not said directly which of the two private international law 
principles should now govern. An underlying criticism was that the Court should refrain 
from interfering with private international law altogether. 10 
Perhaps, however, there was no need for the Court of Justice to decide these questions at 
all, because they did not arise. Axel Flessner argues that both cases were not really private 
international law cases at all- the first involved international tax law, the second issues of 
registration. 11 This interpretation may look comforting to the discipline of private 
international law; it may look untouched. On second view, however, it is even more 
threatening. It means that the Court does not use private international law doctrines at all 
for questions that are, or were, essentially questions of private international law. If such 
fundamental issues like a corporation's personality are now decided under seemingly 
autonomous principles of EU law, what room remains for private international law at all? 
Where, and how, is it still relevant? 
Indeed, in Oberseering the German Bundesgerichtshof as the referring court tried to set 
this straight. 12 The court did not restrain itself to asking whether it had to grant 
7 Private International Law, or Conflict of Laws, deals with three kinds of question: First is the 
question of jurisdiction: Which state's courts are competent to rule on a fact pattern? Second is the 
question of choice of law: Which state's law is applicable to a fact pattern? Third is the question of 
recognition and enforcement of foreign judgments and other public acts: Under what circumstances 
can such acts passed by another state be recognized and enforced? All three questions are 
interrelated, but here the focus shall be only on the second, namely choice of law. 
8 On variants of these principles and on the approaches of different legal systems in Europe see Daniel 
Zimmer, Ein internationales Gesellschaftsrecht flir Europa, 67 Rabels Zeitschrift flir ausliindisches 
und internationals Privatrecht (RabelsZ) 298-317, 299-306 (2003). 
9 Based on no. 23 of the decision, where the court explicitly acknowledges the differences between the 
legal systems of the member states. 
10 For general criticism of the court's approach to private international law see, e. g., Klaus Schurig, 
Unilateralistische Tendenzen im europiiischen Gesellschaftskollisionsrecht, oder: Umgehung als 
Rechtsprinzip, in Liber amicorum Gerhard Kegel, 199-221 (Munich: Beck, 2002). 
11 Axel Flessner, Schiffbruch der Interpreten und Statuten, 8 Zeitschrift flir Europiiisches Privatrecht 
(ZEuP) 1 (2000); see also Harald Halbhuber, Limited Company statt GmbH? Europarechtlicher 
Rahmen und deutscher Widerstand (Baden-Baden: Nomos, 2001); Halbhuber, National doctrinal 
structures and European company law, 38 Common Market Law Review (CMLR) 1385-1419 
(2001), with an analysis of German comments on Daily Mail and Centros; against Flessner, see 
Schurig (supra n. 10) 201 f.: at least registration is an issue of private international law. 
12 Bundesgerichtshof, March 3, 2000, 53 DB 114 (2000); cf. Wulf-Henning Roth, Die Sitzverlegung vor 
dem EuGH, 21 Zeitschrift flir Wirtschaftsrecht (ZIP) 1597 (2005). 
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Uberseering locus standi, but also, more generally, whether European law requires "that a 
company's legal capacity and capacity to be a party to legal proceedings [locus standi] is to 
be determined according to the law of the State where the company is incorporated". 13 The 
Court of Justice decided that this is indeed what European law requires 14 and thereby came 
as close to determining the private international law question as conceivable. 15 This 
decision could raise mixed feelings in the private international law community. On the one 
hand, it makes official that member states have lost the freedom to determine the private 
international law principles autonomously - a blow to a discipline that sees conflict of laws 
as a matter for the individual states. On the other hand, the court seems at least to 
acknowledge that it is dealing with private international law matters, and therefore at least 
decides within a familiar doctrinal framework. 
Actually, things may not be as easy. Even after Uberseering, Christian Joerges speaks 
of the "obsolescence of private international law".16 Arguably, the seat principle would 
still be reconcilable with the decision; it would only be restricted by principles of 
European law. 17 The problem is that the Court of Justice does not decide questions of 
private international law as SUCh.18 Its doctrinal framework, with free movements on the 
one hand, and restrictions justified by certain particular concerns of the member states on 
the other, does not translate easily into a doctrine of private international law (although 
attempts have been made). 19 Even if such a translation is possible, however, it remains 
necessarily a translation - the decision-making process itself is not one of private 
international law. That discipline must apparently remain in a secondary rank; it can, at 
best, re-conceptualize what is decided by other disciplines. 
2) Classical Private International Law and Globalization 
This development is surprising. Private International Law, one would imagine, should 
be better prepared for the challenges posed by Europeanization and globalization than 
most any other legal discipline. Laws with impacts beyond territorial borders, while new 
13 Uberseering (supra n. 1) no. 21. 
14 Uberseering (supra n. 1) no. 93, 95. 
15 Harald Kallmeyer, Tragweite des Uberseeringurteils des EuGH vom 05.11.2002 zur grenziiber-
schreitenden Sitzverlegung, 55 DB 2521-2522 (2002); Helmut Heiss, "Uberseering": Klarschiff im 
internationalen Gesellschaftsrecht?, 44 Zeitschrift fiir Rechtsvergleichung (ZfRV) 90-97, 93-97 
(2003). 
16 Christian Joerges, On the Legitimacy of Europeanising Europe's Private Law, 10 (EUI Working Paper 
No. 2003/3). 
17 Stefan Leible & Jochen Hoffmann, "Uberseering" und das (vermeintliche) Ende der Sitztheorie, 48 
Recht der Internationalen Wirtschaft (RIW) 925-936, 930 ff. (2002); Wulf-Henning Roth, Inter-
nationales Gesellschaftsrecht nach Uberseering, 23 IPRax 117-127, 126f. (2003). 
18 Schurig (supra n. 11) 200. 
19 See, e. g., Jiirgen Basedow, Der kollisionsrechtliche Gehalt der Produktfreiheiten im europiiischen 
Binnenmarkt: favor offerentis, 59 RabelsZ 1-55 (1995); Peter Mankowski, Das Herkunftslandprinzip 
als Internationales Privatrecht der e-commerce-Richtlinie, 100 Zeitschrift fiir Vergleichende Rechts-
wissenschaft (ZVgIRWiss) 137-181 (2001); Stefan Grundmann, Das Internationale Privatrecht der 
e-commerce-Richtlinie - was ist kategorial anders im Kollisionsrecht des Binnenmarkts und warum?, 
67 RabelsZ 246-297 (2003); for an overview, see Ralf Michaels, EU Law as Private International 
Law? Reconceptualizing the Country-of-Origin Principle as Vested-Rights Theory, 2 Journal of 
Private International Law 147-194, 159-163 (2006) with further references. 
123 
for other legal disciplines, have almost by definition always constituted its main object of 
studies. After all, a "conflict of laws" (the discipline's other name)20 is only possible if 
more than one legal regulation is, on its face, applicable to a certain fact pattern. 
Likewise, the discipline both knew of and dealt with the appearance of "the private" in 
the international sphere long before this became an issue of globalization discourse. This is 
evidenced in the discipline's other name, Private International Law, coined already in the 
19th century by Joseph Story.21 Story's ideal of a largely apolitical common approach to 
private law questions, mirrored also in his concept of a far-reaching general common law 
transcending state borders, which he developed in the U.S. Supreme Court decision of 
Swift v. Tyson,22 still shapes thoughts in the field. 
This may be the reason why private international law scholars have not, by and large, 
seen the need to adapt the field to the new paradigms of globalization. 23 In this respect, the 
field differs remarkably from others. For example, in the field of human rights, 
philosophical ideas of universal vs. local values, the interrelatedness of the state's relation 
to its citizens on the one hand and to humanity as a whole on the other, now shape much of 
the legal discussion. Likewise, intellectual property law is now changing its outlook and 
structure, embracing supranational regulations like the TRIPS agreement, transnational 
concepts for transactions outside the scope of such supranational solutions,24 and also 
solutions to insulate local structures of innovation and cultural production from the threat 
of hegemonic commercialization. 
20 See infra n. 21. 
21 Joseph Story, Conflict of Laws § 9. p. 13 (yd ed., Boston: Little & Brown, and London: Maxwell & 
Son, 1846) (The first edition dates from 1834). For Story's influence on Savigny (and thereby on 
European conflicts thinking) see Gerhard Kegel, Wohnsitz und Belegenheit bei Story und Savigny, 52 
RabelsZ 431 (1988); see also Gerhard Kegel, Story and Savigny, 37 Am. J. Compo L. 39-66 (1989). 
Ironically (or perhaps tellingly), while the name "private international law" was imported to Europe 
through Foelix and Schaeffner and became dominant (Internationales Privatrecht, Diritto internazio-
nale privato, droit international prive, derecho internacional privado), in the common law world and 
most notably in the United States the name is still usually "conflict of laws". See Zitelmann, Der 
Name IPR, in 27 Zeitschrift flir internationales Recht 177-196 (1918). 
22 Swift V. Tyson, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 1, \0 L.Ed. 865 (1842). This decision was overruled by Erie 
Railroad Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 58 S. Ct. 817, 82 L.Ed. 1188 (1938) (arguing, amongst 
others, that no law exists without some definite state authority behind it). 
23 Some exceptions: Peter Behrens, Die Bedeutung des Kollisionsrechts flir die "Globalisierung" der 
Wirtschaft, in: Aufbruch nach Europa, (J. Basedow et al. eds., Tlibingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2001); Pedro 
de Miguel Asensio, EI Derecho internacional privado ante la globalizacion, I Anuario Espaiiol de 
Derecho Internacional Privado 37-87 (2001); J. C. Gonzales, Globalizacion y Derecho internacional 
privado (Murcia, 2002). Admittedly, there is more readiness to accept Europeanization of the field. 
See, most recently, M. Wilderspin & X. Lewis, Les relations entre Ie droit communautaire et les 
regles de conflits de lois des Etats membres, 91 Revue critique de droit international prive 1-37, 
289-313 (2002). Here, a connection between Europeanization and globalization is not usually 
established, however, whereas many of the arguments in this paper should be relevant for 
globalization as well. See also Ralf Michaels, Welche GlobaJisierung flir das Recht? Welches Recht 
flir die Globalisierung?, 69 RabelsZ 525-544 (2005). 
24 See most recently the contributions to the Conference on "International Public Goods and Transfer of 
Technology under a Globalized Intellectual Property Regime", Duke University School of Law, April 
3-5, 2003, http://www.law.duke.edultrips/description.html. now published as International Public 
Goods and Transfer of Technology Under a Globalized Intellectual Property Regime (Keith E. 
Maskus & Jerome H. Reichman eds., Cambridge Univ. Press 2005). 
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Few such developments can be seen in the conflict of laws. 25 Sure, many monographs 
and articles in the field now invoke, in their introductions, either globalization explicitly, or 
some equally vague concepts like "a world growing ever closer together", or a "growing 
number of international transactions and situations". From this, their authors draw only the 
conclusion that conflict of laws is becoming more important, not that it must change its 
structure to account for these developments. Yet the reality looks different. Conflict of 
laws, as a discipline, seems to become less and less important. In the European Union, we 
see developments towards a Europeanization of conflict of laws. 26 Yet this development 
should not conceal the fact that a large part of conflict of laws has already become 
Europeanized: a substantive part of the case-law rendered by the Court of Justice in the 
area of the freedoms concerns cases that traditionally would have been conflict of laws 
cases. On a global level, various international regimes compete with national legal orders, 
and amongst each other. 27 Even in Europe, questions of both adjudicatory jurisdiction and 
applicable law are often determined rather through the interpretation of statutes and the 
determination of their (ominous) "extraterritorial applicability" than through classical 
conflict of laws methods. 28 "Classical" scholars of private international law have 
surprisingly little to say within these developments; instead, they often propose legal 
unification to overcome conflicts,29 and to restrict conflict of laws, as a "second best", to 
areas where such unification seems impossible. 30 
The discipline's faith in a universal law of mankind, 31 as well as the tendency to try and 
avoid clashes of policy, are not accidental. Both are elements stemming from the birth of 
classical private international law, as developed in the 19th century by Savigny.32 
25 Klaus GUnther & Shalini Randeria, Recht, Kultur und Gesellschaft im ProzeB der Globalisierung, 
21 f. (Bad Homburg: Werner Reimers Stiftung, 2001). 
26 See, most recently, Erik Jayme & Christian Kohler, Europaisches Kollisionsrecht 2002: Zur 
Wiederkehr des Internationalen Privatrechts, 22 IPRax 461-471 (2002); K. Boele-Woelki & R.H. 
van Ooik, De ingrijpende communautarisering van het internationaale privaatrecht, 2002 Sociaal-
economische wetgeving (SEW) 394-407 (2002), The Communitarization of Private International 
Law, 4 Yearbook of Private International Law 1-36 (2002, published 2003). 
27 On the conflict between such regimes see Joost Pauwelyn, Conflict of Norms in Public International 
Law (Cambridge, 2003). 
28 See Ralf Michaels & Hans-Georg Kamann, Grundlagen eines allgemeinen gemeinschaftlichen 
Richtlinienkollisionsrechts - "Amerikanisierung" des Gemeinschafts-IPR?, 12 Europaisches 
Wirtschafts- und Sozialrecht (EWS) 301-311, 311 (2001). 
29 Ole Lando, The Eternal Crisis, in Festschrift fUr Ulrich Drobnig, 361-379 (TUbingen: Mohr, 1998); 
see also Friedrich K. Juenger, The Problem with Private International Law, in Private Law in the 
International Arena - Liber amicorum Kurt Siehr, 289-309 (Jiirgen Basedow et al. eds., The Hague: 
Asser, 2000). 
30 See my review of I Yearbook of Private International Law (Sarcevic & Volken, eds., 1999), 48 
Netherlands International Law Review (Neth. In!,1 L. Rev.) 108-112, 112 (2001). 
31 For tendencies of private international law towards universalization see Bernard Audit, Le droit 
international prive en quete d'universalite - Cours general de droit international prive, 305 Recueil 
des cours de I' Academie de La Haye 9-487 (2001, published 2003). The hope for legal unity still 
determines traditional comparative law, the sister discipline of private international law. See Ralf 
Michaels, 1m Westen nichts Neues?, 66 RabelsZ 97-115,101, 108f. (1998) with further references. 
32 Friedrich Carl von Savigny, 8 System des heutigen Riimischen Rechts (1849), hereinafter VIII 
System. English quotations are from the translation by William Guthrie, published as "A Treatise on 
the Conflict of Laws" (Edinburgh, 1880). 
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Savigny's conception of conflict of laws, after a crisis in the 1960s and 1970s,33 has 
returned to being the paradigm of conflict of laws thinking, at least in Europe. 34 Its 
neutrality with regard to different legal systems, its assumption of a private law relatively 
free of state intervention, seem ideal for a neo-liberal globalization. Furthermore, many 
deem the "classical" Savignyan system sufficiently t1exible to account for new develop-
ments35 and see no need for another conflicts revolution. 
3) The State as Lens 
This hope may be in vain for the following reason. If classical private international law 
rests on a state paradigm, and if the role of the state in globalization is no longer the same 
as it was in the 19th (and most of the 20th) century, then the field has lost much of its 
foundation. This can only become visible once we make the state the lens through which to 
analyze both classical private international law and modern developments. This seems 
justified, at least from the viewpoint of globalization. After all, the changing situation of 
the state is one important, perhaps the decisive, aspect of globalization. 36 Whether indeed 
it loses in importance, whether it gains, or whether it just undergoes a transmutation -
almost everyone agrees that the state's position in the world is now different from its 
position in the 19th century. This should have an impact on private international law, if it is 
connected to the state. 37 
This paper cannot show that (classical) private international law is inadequate for 
globalization. At best, it can show a much more limited claim to be true or at least 
probable: that the conception of private international law developed by Savigny in the 19th 
century does not hold out to the challenges of globalization. This is a much more modest 
argument, but I hope not an irrelevant one. After all, private international law, at least in 
continental Europe, is still based to a large degree on ideas of Savigny. Furthermore, while 
33 Gerhard Kegel, The 'Crisis' of Conflict of Laws, 112 Recueil des Cours 91-268 (l964-II); see 
already Heinrich Kronstein, Crisis of "Conflict of Laws", 37 Geo. L. J. 483 (1949). 
34 Daniel Zimmer, Savigny und das Internationale Privatrecht unserer Zeit, in Festschrift fiir Fritz Sturm 
zum siebzigsten Geburtstag, 1709 (1999); see also Mathias Reimann, Savigny's Triumph? Choice of 
Law in Contracts Cases at the Close of the Twentieth Century, 39 Virginia Journal of International 
Law 571-605 (1999); Paul Volken, How Common are the General Principles of Private International 
Law? America and Europe Compared, in I Yearbook of Private International Law 85-102 (1999); 
Tito Ballarino & Benedetta Ubertazzi, On Avello and Other Judgements: A New Point of Departure 
in the Conflict of Laws?, 6 Yearbook of Private International Law 85, 124--129 (2004). 
35 See, e. g., Jan Kropholler, Internationales Privatrecht, 15 (4th ed., 2001). An early response to the 
American conflicts revolution, arguing that evolution of the classical system provides similarly 
adequate result, is Bernard Audit, A Continental Lawyer Looks at Contemporary American Choice-
of-Law Principles, 27 Am. J. Compo L. 589-613 (1979). For the most comprehensive adaptation of 
Savigny's theories, see Klaus Schurig, Kollisionsnorm und Sachrecht (1980). 
36 Saskia Sassen, Losing Control? (1996). 
37 This connection is seldom thematized. But see Eugen Ehrlich, Internationales Privatrecht, 126 
Deutsche Rundschau 419-432, 425 (1906); Arthur T. von Mehren, The Significance of the State for 
Choice of Law, in Festschrift fiir Konrad Zweigert zum 70. Geburtstag, 287-306 (H. Bernstein et aI., 
eds., 1981); see also Gerhard Kegel & Klaus Schurig, Internationales Privatrecht (8th ed., Munich: 
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Beck), 7-22 (2000). See now Ralf Michaels, The Re-State-Ment of Non-State Law: The State, 
Choice of Law, and the Challenge from Global Legal Pluralism, 51 Wayne Law Review 1209-1259 
(2005). 
there are several studies on Savigny's conception of private international law, 38 the role of 
the state in it has not yet been analyzed with regard to globalization. 
One may argue that today's private international law looks very different from that of 
Savigny. This is certainly the case. My claim is only that certain essential elements still 
exist more or less in the way that they underlie Savigny's conception, and that these 
elements are connected to the State and become problematic in globalization. Further 
developments within the theory are then not decisive for the argument (although this can, 
of course, only be assumed here). Because the conception is established in the 19th century, 
it is there that we have to look for the paradigms that still, if secretly, shape the discipline. 
Another possible criticism is that even in the 19th century Savigny is not the only 
important figure in private international law, that at least two other writers must be 
mentioned: Joseph Story and Pasquale Stanislao Mancini. 39 Again, the criticism would be 
valid. Yet it may be justified to focus only on Savigny, at least for now. Both for Story's and 
Mancini's conceptions, the role of the state is evident. Story bases his private international 
law on comity between states,40 Mancini bases his on nationality and sovereignty,41 both 
see the discipline as part of international law. The role of the state in Savigny's conception 
is much less obvious. If it can be shown that even for Savigny the state is not only relevant 
but predominant, we can be relatively sure that the state permeates private international 
law thinking in the 19th century altogether. With these caveats, the analysis can begin. 
II. The State in Savigny's Private Interational Law 
The State has found various different forms in history,42 and these various forms have 
been relevant for conceptions of the conflict of laws in different times. The nation state is 
relatively recent and may be of fleeting importance. 43 When we look at Savigny's 
conception of the conflict of laws, we must be aware that he writes before the advent in 
Germany, and as an opponent of, the modem "nation state". 
38 Most recently, Jean-Louis Halperin, Entre nationalisme juridique et communaute de droit, 47-66 
(Paris, 1999); Ulrike Seif, Savigny und das Internationale Privatrecht des 19. Jahrhunderts, 65 
RabelsZ 492-512 (2001). Earlier studies include Max Gutzwiller, Der EinfluB Savignys auf die 
Entwicklung des Internationalprivatrechts (Fribourg 1923); Fritz Sturm, Savigny und das internatio-
nale Privatrecht seiner Zeit, 8 Ius commune 92- 109 (1979); Sakurada, Wirkungsbereich und 
Funktion des Kollisionsrechts - Einige Gedanken iiber Savignys IPR, in: Internationales Privat-
recht. internationa1es Wirtschaftsrecht, 127-144 (Holl & Klinke eds., 1985). 
39 Max Gutzwiller, Internationalprivatrecht: Die drei GroBen des 19. Jahrhunderts, in: Festschrift fiir 
Frank Vischer zum 60. Geburtstag, 131-140 (Peter Bockli et al. eds., Zurich: Schulthess, 1983). 
40 Story (supra n. 21) §§ 33-38, pp. 43-49. 
41 Pasquale Stanislao Mancini, Della nazionalita come fondamento del diritto delle genti (E. Jayme, ed., 
Torino: Giappichelli, 1994); Mancini, De l'utilite de rendre obligatoires pour tous les Etats, sous la 
forme d'un ou de plusieurs traites internationaux, un certain nombre de regles generales du Droit 
international prive pour assurer la decision uniforme des conflits entre les differentes legislations 
civiles et criminelles, I Journal du droit international prive (Clunet) 221 (1874); see Halperin (supra 
n. 38) 67-85. 
42 See Martin van Creveld, The Rise and Decline of the State (1999). 
43 Michael Stolleis, Was kommt nach dem souveriinen Nationalstaat? Und was kann die Rechts-
geschichte dazu sagen?, in European and International Regulation after the Nation State. Different 
Scopes and Multiple Levels 17-30 (Adrienne Heritier, Michael Stolleis & Fritz W. Scharpf eds., 
2004); Jost Delbriick, Das Staatsbild im Zeitalter wirtschaftsrechtlicher Globa1isierung (2002). 
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Nevertheless it should be safe to start with the classical definition of the state rendered 
by the German tradition of "Allgemeine Staatslehre", as developed by Georg lellinek: 44 
The state is the organisation of sedentary people which has .original sovereign power. 45 
Here, the state is defined by three elements: a territory, a population, and state power 
which I will here translate as (internal) sovereignty.46 What remains to be shown is that 
both the state in general and all three of its elements can be found in, and influence, 
Savigny's private international law. 
1) The Role of the State for Private Law 
Fleeting knowledge of Savigny and his theory of law as born from the people's spirit 
(Volksgeist) might lead one to believe that for him law, at least private law, exists outside the 
state. Savigny would then be the perfect idol for a "global law without a state", as is 
proposed for globalization. 47 It is well known that Savigny is an opponent of codification, 48 
and that, although he approves of the primacy of legislation over customary and scientific 
law,49 he does not think highly of state legislation in the area of private law in general. Yet it 
would be a fundamental misunderstanding to think that Savigny's conception of (private) 
law was independent of the state. 50 Granted, Savigny argues that law emanates from the 
people, so neither state nor jurists seem necessary. Nevertheless, there are two important 
connections between state and private law in Savigny's thinking. 
The first one may appear obvious: the state enforces the law, through civil procedure 
and criminal law, including criminal procedure. Savigny calls this the "first and irrefutable 
task of the state, to make the idea of law govern in the visible world". 51 Yet these areas of 
the law are public law (offentliches Recht) and thus distinct from private law. Savigny's 
private law exists independent of its enforcement in the courts, and is therefore not. as it 
often is in the common law world, part of civil procedure. 
44 Georg lellinek, Allgemeine Staatslehre 394-434. (3th ed., Berlin: Springer, 1914); see most recently 
Jens Kersten, Georg Jellinek und die klassische Staatslehre (2000). 
45 "Der Staat ist die mit urspriinglicher Herrschermacht ausgeriistete Verbandseinheit sesshafter 
Menschen". Jellinek (supra n. 44) p. 180f. 
46 Staatsgebiet, Staatsvolk, Staatsgewalt. See, e. g., Josef Isensee, Staat und Verfassung, in: I Handbuch 
des Staatsrechts, § 13, no. 28 ff. (Josef Isensee & Paul Kirchhof eds., Heidelberg: C. F. Muller 1987). 
Sovereignty is one important part of state power for lellinek: Jellinek (supra n. 44), 435-489. 
47 Global Law Without a State (Gunther Teubner ed., Aldershot et aI., 1997). 
48 See his classical work "Vom Beruf unserer Zeit fur Gesetzgebung und Rechtswissenschaft (1814, 
reprint in Thibaut und Savigny - Ihre programmatischen Schriften, 95-192 (H. Hattenhauer. ed., 
1973); English translation: The vocation of our age for Legislation and Jurisprudence, translated from 
the German of Frederick Charles von Savigny by Abraham Hayward, 2nd ed., London: Littlewood & 
Co., 1831); see also Politik und neuere Legislationen - Materialien zum "Geist der Gesetzgebung" 
(H. Akamatsu & J. Ruckert, eds., 2000). 
49 See Savigny, I System des heutigen Romischen Rechts (1840), § 13 (pp. 38-44) (hereafter I System). 
50 As is apparently assumed by Christian Joerges, Zum Funktionswandel des Kollisionsrechts, 6 (1971); 
Seif (supra n. 38) 501: law as organic expression of the people, not part of the state order ("organische 
LebensauBerung des Volkes und nicht Bestandteil der staatlichen Ordnung"); already KJaus Vogel, 
Der raumliche Anwendungsbereich der Verwaltungsrechtsnorm, 215 ff. (FrankfurtlM. & Berlin, 
1965). For Savigny, this antagonism of people and state does not exist, because his conception of the 
state is different. 
51 Savigny, I System § 9, pp. 25-27; Dieter Strauch, Recht, Gesetz und Staat bei Friedrich Carl von 
Savigny, 100 (2nd ed., Bonn 1963 J. 
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This connection between state and private law becomes relevant, however, in a more 
general sense, and this is the second connection. Savigny does not distinguish between 
state as government and as people, as Anglo-American theories would do. Quite to the 
contrary, he argues explicitly that every people appears as state. 52 Consequently, a state of 
nature - where there is private law without a state - is inconceivable, 53 and "private 
legislation,,54 (or even private codification 55), in particular private contracts, do not 
become law56 (unlike the famous Art. 1134 of the French Code Civil 57). Put simply, just as 
the people only attain reality through the state, the people's (private) law becomes law only 
through the state as well. 58 Savigny's political conservatism prevents him from embracing 
ideas of a quasi-spontaneous privately formed law. 
Thus, private law is always state law. However, Savigny's state is not a government 
separate from the people, with discretion to legislate as the ruler pleases. Instead, because 
Savigny sees the state as the organizing form of the people, consequently legislation 
emanates from, and therefore reflects, both customary and scientific law. What Savigny 
rejects is not the idea of private law as state law, but of private law based on a ruler's 
discretion, on politics. 59 Politics can be left to public law - an area of the law that Savigny 
distinguishes sharply from private law. Public law is political (and therefore unscientific 
and comparably uninteresting from a scientific point of view),60 private law is scientific 
and in this sense apolitical, pure. 61 
52 Savigny, I System § 9, p. 23: "Vielmehr wird jedes Volk, sobald es als solches erscheint, zugleich als 
Staat erscheinen, wie auch dieser gestaltet seyn mdge.", § 10, p. 29: "miissen wir wiederholt 
behaupten, daB der Staat urspriinglich und naturgemaB in einem Volk, durch das Volk, und fur das 
Volk entsteht." (emphases in original). See already Savigny, Juristische Methodenlehre - nach der 
Ausarbeitung des Jakob Grimm, 14 (Wesenberg, ed., 1951); cf. Strauch (supra n. 51) 20-22, 98. 
53 Okko Behrends, Geschichte, Politik und Jurisprudenz in F. C. v. Savignys System des heutigen 
rdmischen Rechts, in Rdmisches Recht in der europaischen Tradition - Symposion aus AnlaB des 75. 
Geburtstages von Franz Wieacker, 257-321, 266ff. (Behrends et al. eds., Ebelsbach: Gremer, 1985). 
54 Ferdinand Kirchhof, Private Rechtsetzung (Berlin: Duncker & Humblot, 1987); Global Law Without 
a State (supra n. 47). 
55 Catherine Kessedjian, La codification privee, in E Pluribus Unum - Liber amicorum Georges A. L. 
Droz, 135-149 (1996); Ralf Michaels, Privatautonomie und Privatkodifikation, 62 RabelsZ 580-626 
(1998). 
56 Savigny, I System § 6, p. 12. For the question of contract as a source of law in Roman law see Zoltan 
Yegh, Ex pacto ius - Studien zum Vertrag als Rechtsquelle bei den Rhetoren, 11 0 Zeitschrift fiir 
Rechtsgeschichte, Romanistische Abteilung (SavZlRom), 184-295 (1993). Savigny was also 
opposed to social contract theories of the state, see Savigny, I System § 10, p. 29. 
57 "Les conventions legalement fonnees tiennent lieu de loi 11 ceux qui les ont faits." 
58 Savigny, I System § 9. 
59 Savigny, Vom Beruf (supra n. 48) 16 (Thibaut und Savigny, 106); Savigny, Ober den Zweck dieser 
Zeitschrift [Zeitschrift flir geschichtliche Rechtswissenschaftl; in Thibaut und Savigny (supra n. 48) 
261-268, 264. 
60 See Joachim RUckert, Idealismus, Jurisprudenz und Politik bei Friedrich Carl von Savigny, 397-399 
(Ebelsbach: Verlag Rolf Gremer 1984); Olivier Beaud, Savigny et Ie droit public. Plaidoyer pour une 
lecture politique de l'reuvre de Savigny, in Recht zwischen Natur und Geschichte, 193-205 (Ius 
Commune Sonderheft 100, Kervegan & Mohnhaupt eds., 1997). For connections between the 
historical school and public law, see Michael Stolleis, Die historische Schule und das Offentliche 
Recht, in Die Bedeutung der Wdrter - Studien zur europaischen Rechtsgeschichte, Festschrift flir Sten 
Gagner, 495-508 (Stolleis ed., 1991). See also Claudio Cesa, Sulle idee politiche della scuola storica, 
16 Annali della Scuola Nonnale Superiore di Pisa: Classe di Lettere e Filosofia, 83-106 (1986). 
61 See Joachim Riickert, The Unrecognized Legacy: Savigny's Influence on Gennan Jurisprudence after 
1900,37 Am. J. Compo L. 121-137, 136 (1989); Riickert, Savignys Konzeption von Jurisprudenz und 
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Thus we find that the state plays a central role for Savigny's conception of all law, 
including private law. This central role is quintessential for the development of classical 
private international law as well. By transcending the distinction between people and 
state,62 Savigny makes it possible to think of private law as the emanation of the people's 
spirit, and still conceptualize private international law as a system of conflicts between 
state laws. On the one hand, the state enforces laws (domestic or foreign) with its 
institutions, namely the judge. On the other side of the equation, the sovereign state also 
defines, and limits, the "law" to be chosen by choice of law, the applicable law. The 
classical choice-of-law process always directs the state judge to apply state law. 63 Thus, 
the state is present both as enforcer, and as creator of enforceable law, as subject and object 
of the choice-of-law process. 
2) Sovereignty 
Thus, the state is indeed central to Savigny's private international law. How do 
JelIinek's three elements64 fare? The first element of interest is sovereignty. Sovereignty 
is, of course, quintessential for theories of private international law as part of international 
law. Thus, before Savigny, Joseph Story devotes passages of his treatise to comity as a way 
to overcome concerns of sovereignty. After Savigny, Mancini sees sovereignty as one 
building block of private international law. Yet both consider private international law as 
international law, so the importance of sovereignty is not surprising. How does sovereignty 
figure in Savigny's concept of private international law? Is not sovereignty reserved to 
questions of public law (and politics)? 
Generally, the question appears in private international law as perhaps its primordial 
problem: Why should a judge ever apply foreign law? Why should he, if his own law and 
foreign law provide different rules for the situation at hand, prefer the foreign law to his 
own? From a practical point of view, there may be several reasons - predictability and 
uniformity of results, party expectations, all these are considerations favoring such 
application. Also, if a legislator directs the judge to apply foreign law, positive law 
solves the question. 65 Yet legislation is rare at Savigny's time (and still incomplete today). 
Moreover, this positivistic recourse to the legislature does not answer the prior philosoph-
ical/ political problem involved in submitting to foreign law, both as a question outside 
legislation, and as a question for the legislator. 
At least three ideas have been conceived to justify such a submission. 66 First, one might 
want to circumvent the problem by arguing that the judge does not really apply foreign law 
Recht, ihre Folgen und ihre Bedeutung bis heute, 61 Tijdschrift voor rechtsgeschiedenis 65-95, 82 f. 
(1993). 
62 For this aspect see particularly Riickert (supra n. 60) 312-328. 
63 Gerhard Kegel & Klaus Schurig (supra n. 37) 16; Rest. (2d) Conflict of Laws § 1 (1971); Michaels 
(supra n. 37) 1228-1231. 
64 Supra n, 44. 
65 Savigny, VIII System 26, 130. 
66 The third solution is the fiction that the judge applies a new ad hoc rule of his own law, modeled after 
that of the foreign legal system. This solution, disregarded by Savigny, has been favored both in the 
United States as "local law theory", and in Italy as "incorporation theory", For the U.S. see Guinness 
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at all (and therefore does not submit to the foreign sovereign). This solution materializes in 
the 19th century theory of vested rights ("wohlerworbene Rechte",67 "droits acquis,,68). As 
Dicey, one of its most important later propagators, writes: "[T]he courts, e. g. of England, 
never in strictness enforce foreign law; when they are said to do so, they enforce not 
foreign laws, but rights acquired under foreign laws.,,69 The theory gains even more 
popularity in the United States, where it enters into the Restatement through its propagator 
Beale 70 _ before being debunked by legal realism. 71 In Europe, this debunking has already 
taken place when Savigny writes his 1849 treatise on private international law. In 1841142, 
Carl Georg von Wachter has rejected the theory on two grounds. First it is circular: the 
judge cannot determine whether a right has been acquired under a foreign law without 
applying that foreign law; yet whether that law is applicable is exactly what the process 
should establish. Second, the argument is inconclusive: only the state that has granted a 
right can be held obliged to enforce it; that state cannot impose an obligation on other 
states to enforce rights "vested" under its law.72 Savigny approves. 73 
The second theory to avoid a clash between sovereigns is the theory of comitas (Voet, 
Huber), comity (Dicey, Story), or courtoisie (Foelix, Vareilles-Sommieres) 74. Under this 
theory, sovereigns enforce each other's laws on the basis of courtesy. This is less than an 
obligation (thus there is no submission), but more than mere discretion,75 a very vague 
concept somewhere between law and politics / international relations. The problem with 
the concept is, of course, that it only explains why, in certain situations, sovereigns may 
v. Miller, 291 Fed. 769 (S.D.N.Y. 1923), aff'd, 299 Fed. 538 (2d Cir. 1924), aff'd sub nom. Hicks v. 
Guinness, 269 U.S. 71 (1925) perJ. Hand; Walter Wheeler Cook, The Logical and Legal Bases of the 
Conflict of Laws, 29 (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard Univ. Press 1942); cf. David F. Cavers, The Two 
"Local Law" Theories, 63 Harv. L. Rev. 822-832 (1950), reprinted in Cavers, The Choice-of-Law 
Process, 45-55 (1985). For Italy see Bernardini, Produzione di norme giuridiche mediante rinvio 
(Milan, 1966). 
67 Horst Muller, Der Grundsatz des wohlerworbenen Rechts im internationalen Privatrecht (Hamburg, 
1935); Max Keller & Kurt Siehr, Allgemeine Lehren des internationalen Privatrechts (Zurich: 
Schulthess, 1986), 418-426; for criticism see Jan Kropholler, Internationales Privatrecht, § 21.1, 
pp. 141-144 (4th ed., 2001). 
68 Antoine Pillet, La tMorie generale des droits acquis, 8 Recuei1 des Cours 485-538 (I925-I1I). 
69 Albert Venn Dicey, A Digest of the Law of England with Reference to the Conflict of Laws, 11 (2nd 
ed. 1908). 
70 Restatement, Conflict of Laws (1934); Joseph Beale, Treatise on the Conflict of Laws (1935); see 
also Soater v. Mexican National Railroad Co., 194 U.S. 120, 126 (1904) per J. Holmes. 
71 For an attempted revival, see Perry Dane, Vested Rights, "Vestedness", and Choice of Law, 96 Yale L. 
J. 1191-1275 (1987) with further references. 
72 Carl Georg von Wachter, Ueber die Collision der Privatrechtsgesetze verschiedener Staaten 
(Fortsetzung), 25 Archiv fUr die civilistische Praxis (AcP) 1-9 (1842). On Wachter, see Kurt H. 
Nade1mann, Wachter's Essay on the Collision of Private Laws of Different States, 13 Am. J. Compo 
L. 414-428 (1964); Nikolaus Sandmann, Grund1agen und Enfluss der internationa1privatrechtlichen 
Lehre Carl Georg von Wachters (1797-1880) (Diss. Munster, 1979); see also Paul Vo1ken, Wenn 
Wachter mit Story, in Private Law in the International Arena (supra n. 29) 815-828. 
73 Savigny, I System § 361, p. 132. 
74 For actual relevance see Lawrence Collins, Comity in Modem Private International Law, in: Reform 
and Development of Private International Law - Essays in Honour of Sir Peter North 89-110 (James 
Fawcett ed., Oxford: Oxford Univ. Press, 2002). 
75 But see Alan Watson, Joseph Story and the Comity of Errors (Athens and London: Univ. of Georgia 
Press, 1992) (arguing that Huber had stated a duty to apply foreign law, and that Story, in invoking a 
degree of discretion, had misunderstood him). 
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agree to enforce foreign laws, but does not give any guidelines or principles when this is, or 
should be, done. 
Savigny accepts this concept of comity 76 but changes it dramatically. On the one hand, 
he establishes comity as a duty to apply foreign laws. 77 On the other hand, he denies that 
any submission of one sovereign to the other is necessary. Indeed, he does not see choice of 
law as a problem of sovereignty at all. 78 The reason must be seen in his conception of 
private law. Differences between the private laws of states are a fact of the European state 
of things in the 19th century. Yet they are not, in Savigny's mind, based on clashes of 
politics 79 or sovereigns, but on an imperfect state of development, and they can be 
overcome over time. Thus, the conflict of laws is no real conflict for Savigny, because the 
ground for differences was not different political opinions. By privatizing conflict of laws, 
Savigny avoids the possibility of a clash. 80 
The reason for the lack of a clash is only partly the apolitical character of private law. 
Another important factor is Savigny's conviction that all Christian nations (and these are 
the only ones he is interested in) ultimately share the same underlying values in their 
private laws. 81 Thus, even if private law is not value-free, a conflict of laws between 
Christian nations is still not a conflict between different values, because Christianity serves 
as an overarching framework within which conflicts take place. 
This "privatization" of choice of law can also be seen in Savigny's method. Instead of 
determining the territorial scope of statutes, Savigny seeks for the "seat" of a "legal 
relation" in order to determine the law applicable to it. This has famously been called a 
"Copernican Revolution" Ckopernikanische Wende,,).82 Logically, the difference is one 
of starting point only, not of result: Whether one determines the scope of a statute and then 
finds which relations fit under it, or whether one starts with the relation and determines the 
applicable statute, should make no difference in outcome. Savigny was well aware of this 
himself. 83 Yet there is a difference. Partly it is (merely) psychological. 84 By starting with 
the legal relation, Savigny is able to assert an argumentative primacy of this relation over 
the applicable law. It is not the lawmaker who decides what situations he wants to cover, it 
is the situation which determines the appropriate lawmaker. Starting with the statute and 
its scope of application has a political, public overtone; starting with the legal relation 
emphasizes the private, apolitical character of the choice-of-Iaw process. Actually, 
76 Savigny, VIII System § 348, p. 28: "freundliche Zulassung". 
77 Ibid. 
78 Savigny, VIII System § 348, p. 25; see also Seif (supra n. 38) 509. 
79 Paul Neuhaus, Savigny und die Rechtsfindung aus der Natur der Sache, IS RabelsZ 364, 376 (1949/ 
50). 
80 Savigny's depoliticization of choice of law has been emphasized frequently; see only critically J. E. 1. 
Th. Deelen, De blinddoek van von Savigny (Amsterdam, 1966); Hans Ulrich Jessurun d'Oliveira, De 
ruine van een paradigma: de konfliktregel (Deventer, 1976); Joerges (supra n. 50), 9 f. 
81 Savigny, VIII System § 346, p. 17. Story had already distinguished Christian from heathen laws: 
Story (supra n. 21) § 25, p. 36. 
82 Neuhaus (supra n. 79) 366 (1949/50). 
83 Savigny, I System § 344, pp. 1-3; cf. Schurig (supra n. 35) 115 f. 
84 Kegel & Schurig (supra n. 37) 165 f., with a slightly different emphasis. 
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however, the difference is not only psychological. 85 By looking at the (potential) scope of 
application of a statute, it is possible that more than one statute claims applicability - a true 
conflict in the jargon of governmental interest analysis. 86 If we start with the legal relation, 
such a true conflict is impossible: a legal relation has only one seat, and this seat 
determines the applicable law. Conflicts are made impossible. 
Consequently, this apolitical conception of choice of law is appropriate only for private 
law in a narrow sense. Savigny himself proposes a different treatment for "laws, whose 
peculiar nature does not admit of so free an application of the community of law obtaining 
between different states".87 He distinguishes two kinds of such laws: first "laws of a 
strictly positive, imperative nature", and second, "legal institutions of a foreign state, of 
which the existence is not at all recognized in ours, and which, therefore, have no claim to 
the protection of our courts".88 In modem terminology, these are internationally 
mandatory rules and the public policy exception. Here, sovereignty does playa role: 
the legislator's will is decisive. 89 Savigny acknowledges a political choice-of-Iaw system 
with the possibility of clashing sovereignties, and it may be due to the relative brevity of 
his article devoted to the question that this aspect has become only an exception, an 
afterthought to classical choice of law. 90 
In one sense, therefore, it Savigny's concept of private international law may seem less 
closely linked to state sovereignty - and thus more apt for globalization - than that of other 
authors. If private law is essentially value-neutral (at least vis-a-vis other Christian states), 
then there seems to be no need to restrict private international law to state laws, linked with 
a sovereign. It seems possible to apply non-state laws, chosen according to non-state 
criteria, as well. Yet such a concept would no longer be in accordance with Savigny's 
concept because of his emphasis on a necessary connection between law and state. As a 
matter of fact, this necessary connection makes the state particularly important for his 
approach. Others may distinguish between sovereign-related private laws, where conflicts 
must be solved by comity or some other means, and other private laws, where the state can 
be left behind. For Savigny, this second category of laws simply does not exist. 
3) Territory 
The second element of the state - territory - has perhaps become even more important 
than the first. Savigny is not, of course, the first to introduce territory into private 
international law. Almost since the birth of the discipline, there has been a growing tension 
between the older principle of personality and the younger one of territoriality. In the middle 
85 See also Paul Heinrich Neuhaus, Abschied von Savigny?, 46 RabelsZ 1-25, 8 f. (1982). 
86 See Eugene F. Scoles, Peter Hay et aI., Conflict of Laws § 2.9, pp. 25-38 (3rd ed., St. Paul, West, 
2000). 
87 Savigny, VIII System § 349, p. 32. 
88 Id. at § 349, p. 33. 
89 Id. at § 349, p. 34 f. 
90 In a sense, both the governmental interest analysis in the United States and the "political school" of 
choice of law in Germany only reverse the rule-exception relation: for them, the political aspect 
becomes the rule, the apolitical one the exception. 
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ages, the applicable law was that of the individual's clan, a personal criterion. Territoriality 
arises, as the factor to detennine the applicable law, with the rise of the territorial state. As 
such, however, it is closely connected to questions of sovereignty - because sovereignty is 
territorial, so is the scope of jurisdiction, the reach of the sovereign's will. 
In the light of this close connection between sovereignty (over territory) and 
territoriality, it is interesting to note that Savigny, while otherwise rather opposed to 
sovereignty as basis for private international law, not only maintains, but even enhances 
the territorial aspect. For him, the conflict of laws is not a conflict of sovereigns over 
territories, but still a conflict of territorial laws. 91 His relevant criterion to determine the 
applicable law is the "seat" ("Sitz"),92 the "home" ("Heimath,,)93 of a legal relation. This 
is evidently a territorial quality of this relation, making it necessary to place it in a 
physical, territorial location. 
The seat may not be a purely territorial concept,94 at least not in a purely factual sense. 
Savigny is eager to distinguish his approach not only from the theory of vested rights with 
its territorial idea that rights "vest" in a territory before their bearer travels. 95 He also 
criticizes an earlier Gennan author, Wilhelm Peter Schaeffner, although Schaeffner also 
emphasizes the legal relations as the starting point, trying to determine "where it came into 
existence".96 The difference is not easy to spot. 97 In all likelihood, Savigny is critical of 
Schaeffner's apparent emphasis on a merely factual geographical determination. Appar-
ently, Savigny's conception of "seat" (just as that of Besitz, possession),98 is not merely 
factual, but a combination of factual (geographical) and ideal/legal elements. 
Nevertheless, as a consequence of the emphasis of the "seat", Savigny's choice-of-law 
rules for particular legal relations are entirely territorial in nature. He sees four relevant 
elements: 99 domicile, place of a thing, place of an act, place of the court. All four elements 
are territorial in nature. Consequently, it is not surprising that Savigny's particular choice-
of-law rules are territorial as well. Personal status is determined by domicile (§§ 362-
365), the same is true for the law of succession (§§ 379-380) and matrimonial questions; 
here, the husband's domicile is decisive (§ 379-380). The law of things is determined by 
the location of the things (for movable and immovable property alike) (§§ 366-368). The 
law of contract depends on a territorial connection as well: the place of perfonnance 
(§ 370). Discarded is another possible territorial connection, the place of execution; it 
remains relevant for fonnal requirements of juridical acts (§ 381). 
91 Savigny, VIII System § 346, p. 18, defines the relevant question as: "What territorial law is 
applicable in any given case?" (emphasis in original). 
92 VIII System § 360, p. 108; see already § 348, p. 28. 
93 Id. at § 360, p. 108, § 361, p. 120. 
94 Max Gutzwiller, Der EinfluB Savignys auf die Entwicklung des Intemationalprivatrechts (1923); Leo 
Raape & Fritz Sturm, I Intemationales Privatrecht 410 (Munich: Vahlen, 1977). 
95 Supra, p. 131. 
96 Wilhelm Peter Schaeffner, Entwicklung des intemationalen Privatrechts, 40 (1841). On Schaeffner 
see Stefan Wagner, Wilhelm Peter Schaeffner, 17 Praxis des Intemationalen Privat- und Verfahrens-
rechts (IPRax) 73-76 (1997). 
97 Kegel (supra n. 21) 61 is "taken aback" by Savigny's criticism of Schaeffner. 
98 Savignv, Das Recht des Besitzes. Eine civilistische Abhandlung 22 (GieBen: Heyer 1803). 
99 Savigny, VIII System, § 361, p. 120f. 
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Most of these results are not new compared to those of older theories. lOo Savigny 
emphasizes territory over personality more than others before him, but he remains within 
the old territoriality / personality dichotomy. Nevertheless, the change he brings about in 
the starting point of the analysis - the legal relation - places these traditional results on a 
whole new basis. Under the old statute theory, the territoriality principle has been a direct 
function of the territorial boundaries of sovereignty. The sovereign power extended only to 
the state's boundaries; hence the state's laws have a territorially limited scope of 
application. Savigny's conception of legal relations, because it does not rely on the basis 
of such power, could, in theory, allow for non-territorial factors to determine the applicable 
law as well - provided that law could be thought as non-territorial. Yet ultimately it 
appears that Savigny uses territorial factors because law is still territorial for him. The 
law's territoriality comes not from the sovereign's limited power but from the territoriality 
of the people as the source of private law. 101 This territoriality of law is nowhere really 
justified (at least not in Vol. VIII of the System) but rather assumed; yet that only makes it 
more relevant for Savigny's private international law. 
4) Citizenship 
Territoriality does not become the predominant principle for the conflict of laws 
without an argument. In fact, Savigny devotes a lengthy passage to the distinction between 
origo and domicilium, or origin (a personal concept) and domicile (a territorial 
concept).102 The relative length of this passage may seem surprising.103 One possible 
explanation is rather trivial: the American Joseph Story, in his work on the conflict of laws 
that will be so influential on Savigny,104 starts with the definition of domicile. 105 Yet there 
is also a political background to Savigny's need to explain, at length, his preference of 
territoriality over citizenship. The personality principle was originally, in pre-modem 
times, a tribal concept; 106 as such, it is outdated for Savigny's time and easy to discard. Yet 
the personality principle has been reinvented, so to speak, as the principle of nationality, 
together with the birth of the nation state. Art. 3 (3) of the new French Code Civil provides: 
"The laws relating to the condition and privileges of persons govern Frenchmen, although 
residing in a foreign country." 107 Here, the connecting factor is a personal one, namely 
100 Seif (supra n. 38), 496-499. 
101 Savigny, VIII System, § 346, p. 16 f. 
102 Savigny, VIII System, §§ 350-359, pp. 39-106. On the principle of domicile for Savigny, see 
Gerhard Kegel, Wohnsitz und Belegenheit bei Story und Savigny, 52 RabelsZ 431-465, 437-442 
(1988). 
103 Halperin (supra n. 38), 58 thinks that the passage "parait anachronique, voire inutile, au lecteur 
moderne". 
104 Kegel (supra n. 21). 
105 Story (supra n. 21), ch. 3, pp. 50ff. 
106 Savigny himself wrote about the medieval principle; see his Geschichte des romischen Rechts im 
Mittelalter, 115 ff. (2nd ed., 1834). See, more recently, Simeon L. Guterman, The Principle of the 
Personality of Law in the Early Middle Ages: A Chapter in the Evolution of Western Legal 
Institutions and Ideas, 21 U. of Miami L. Rev. 259-348 (1966/67); Guterman, The Principle of the 
Personality of Law in the Germanic Kingdoms of Western Europe from the Fifth to the Eleventh 
Century (Peter Lang, 1990); Keller & Siehr (supra n.67) §§ 2-3, pp. 11-20 (1986). 
107 See Halperin (supra n. 38) 25 f. 
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nationality. Savigny thinks the principle itself mostly irrelevant in practice 108 - an 
evaluation which is hardly true even in his time. More importantly, the underlying idea 
of nationality must be anathema to his political thinking, just as the nation state was, and 
potentially dangerous. Savigny does see the attractiveness of nationality. He considers the 
possibility of limiting domicile to conflicts of laws within a state, and adopting nationality 
for conflicts between different states, but rejects nationality as a connecting factor here as 
well. 109 It is only Mancini in Italy, somewhat later, who introduces the principle of 
nationality as one of the three determining factors for private international law 110 (the 
other two being party autonomy 111 and sovereign state interests) and makes it so popular 
that the German legislator, who is otherwise thought to have followed Savigny in many 
respects,112 adopts nationality over domicile as the connecting factor for personal 
issues. 113 
The connection between a principle of nationality and the (nation) state is easier to see 
than that between Savigny's concept of domicile and the state. Nevertheless, such a 
connection exists. Savigny's rejection of nationality as connecting factor reflects a 
rejection of the nation state, not of the state as such. A valuable insight comes from 
Savigny's conception of the citizen. 114 This conception is less political than a concept of 
nationality. In fact, in his treatise on private international law, he admits that domicile (as 
the determining factor) is more accidental, and more open to manipulation by the 
individual, than other criteria. liS Nevertheless, citizenship is what defines the individ-
108 Savigny, VIII System § 359, p. 98 f. 
109 Savigny, VIII System § 359, pp. 98-101. Savigny discusses the French code civil and the Prussian 
General Land Law and omits the Austrian General Civil Code. which, in its Art. 4, provided 
applicability of the Code on Austrian nationals. On private international law in the three natural law 
codifications, see Halperin (supra n. 38) 22-27. 
110 Della nazionalita come fondamento del diritto delle genti di Pasquale Stanislao Mancini (Erik Jayme, 
ed., Torino 1994); Ferdinando Treggiari, Nationales Recht und Recht der NationaliUit - Mancini, in 
Nation und Staat im Internationalen Privatrecht, 145-164 (Jayme & Mansel eds., Heidelberg: C.F. 
Miiller 1990). 
III Yuko Nishitani, Mancini und die Parteiautonomie im internationalen Privatrecht (Tiibingen: Mohr, 
2000); Nishitani, Mancini e I' autonomia della volonta nel diritto internazionale privato, 28 Rivista di 
diritto internazionale privato e processuale 23-44 (2001). 
112 This may actually be a post facto reinterpretation, no doubt facilitated because a large part of the 
travaux preparatoires were not published until 1973: Die geheimen Materialien zur Kodifikation des 
deutschen IPR 1881-1896 (Hartwieg & Korkisch eds., 1973); see also I Die VorJagen der Redaktoren 
fiir die erste Kommission zur Ausarbeitung des Entwurfs eines Biirgerlichen Gesetzbuches, 
Allgemeiner Teil, Verfasser Albert Gebhard, 129-308 (Werner Schubert ed., 1981); Michael Behn, 
Die Entstehungsgeschichte der einseitigen Kollisionsnormen des EGBGB ... , 19-194 (FrankfurtlM.: 
Haag & Herchen, 1980). On the legislator's approach to choice of law, see Oskar Hartwieg, Der 
Gesetzgeber des EGBGB zwischen den Fronten heutiger Kollisionsrechts-Theorien, 42 RabelsZ 
431-455,433 (1978) (arguing that Savigny was comparatively unimportant). 
113 Heinz-Peter Mansel, L'adoption du principe de la nationalite par Ie EGBGB du 18 aofi11896, in Liber 
Memorialis Laurent, 869-879 (Brussels 1989); Mansel, Mancini, v. Savigny und die 
Kodifikation des deutschen internationalen Privatrechts von 1896, in Deutsche Rechtswissenschaft 
und Staatslehre im Spiegel der italienischen Rechtskultur wahrend der zweiten HaIfte des 
19. Jahrhunderts, 245-295 (Reiner Schulze ed., Berlin: Duncker & Humblot, 1990); Erik Jayme, 
Pasquale Stanislao Mancini e 10 sviluppo del diritto internazionale privato tedesco, 3 Scienza e 
politica 31 ff. (1990). 
114 Hans-Christof Kraus, Begriff und Verstandnis des "Biirgers" bei Savigny, 110 SavZ/Rom 552-601 
(1993); id. 587 f. on the passages in VIII System. 
115 Savigny, VIII System § 346, p. 17. 
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ual's membership with the people. Since, in tum, the people has its reality in the state, 
citizenship, mediated through the people, connects the individual with the law of a 
particular state. Savigny says so explicitly. 116 Thus, citizenship (as a factor of the state) 
does playa role for Savigny's private international law, and it is connected to the state. 
With regard to private international law, Savigny's concept of citizenship collapses into 
a territorial concept, namely domicile. Savigny considers nationality less relevant for two 
reasons, and both are interesting from a view of globalization. The first indeed sounds 
strikingly modem and global: the increasing commerce between the peoples makes 
differences between nationalities less harsh and less relevant. 117 Yet there is a second, 
somewhat more startling reason: "The influence of Christianity ... as a common bond of 
spiritual life embracing the most diverse nations, has thrown their characteristic 
differences more and more into the background.,,118 This means that Savigny's system 
of private international law is really made only for Christian nations, and excludes non-
Christians, especially Jews. 119 Savigny's relation to the Jews has been the object of several 
studies 120 and is not of interest here as such. What is relevant is the somewhat paradoxical 
result that Savigny's concept of domicile makes different treatment of Jews within the 
applicable territorial law possible. A nationality principle in the sense of the modern nation 
states would, normally, emancipate the Jews and thereby treat them like other nationals -
as happened in France in 1791.121 A different interpersonal private international law could 
treat the Jews as a different nation and apply their own laws to them. While Savigny does 
apparently consider such a treatment of the Christian church as independent from the 
state, 122 the Jews do not benefit from such treatment. Under Savigny's territorial approach, 
if Prussian law is applicable, this includes the special discriminatory provisions for 
Jews. 123 His private international law remains a conflict between state laws, with no place 
for non-state law. Before private international law, personal alliance is to a state only. 
116 Savigny, VIII System § 346, p. 14. 
117 Savigny, VIII System § 346, p. 17. Cf. Jilrgen Basedow, The Effects of Globalization on Private 
International Law, in Legal Aspects of Globalization, 1-10, 8 f. (Basedow & Kono eds., The Hague: 
Kluwer, 2000). 
118 Savigny, VIII System § 346, p. 17. 
119 Savigny's most pronounced (and most-cited) statement about the Jew as stranger is in Savigny, 
Stimmen fUr und wider neue Gesetzbilcher, 3 Zeitschrift fUr geschichtliche Rechtswissenschaft 1-52, 
reprinted in Thibaut und Savigny (supra n. 49) 231-254, 241: "Vollends die Juden sind und bleiben 
uns ihrem innern Wesen nach Fremdlinge". 
120 On the question of Savigny's purported antisemitism see, most recently, Thomas Henne & Carsten 
Kretschmann, Der christlich fundierte Antijudaismus Savignys und seine Umsetzung in der 
Rechtspraxis, 119 Zeitschrift fUr Rechtsgeschichte - germanistische Abteilung (SavZ/Ger) 250-
315 (2002). 
121 See more generally Patrick Weil, Qu'est-ce qu'un Histoire de la nationalite 
depuis la Revolution (Paris: Grasset, 2002). 
122 Savigny sometimes considers the Catholic Church as a State; see Savigny, II Geschichte des 
Rtimischen Rechts im Mittelalter, 261 f. (Heidelberg 1816). In his System of Contemporary Roman 
Law, the church is said to exist besides the state: Savigny, I System § 9, pp. 27 f. 
123 Savigny, VIII System § 349, p. 36: a Prussian law prohibiting Jews to acquire land applies also to 
foreign Jews. The quote does not express a particularly anti-Semitic tendency; see also Henne & 
Kretschmann (supra n. 120) 31Of. Contra (perhaps): Sturm (supra n. 38) 102. 
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III. Savigny's System in Globalization 
Summing up the previous section, the state is visible in Savigny's concept of private 
international law in various ways. The state is relevant insofar as all private law is state law, 
and the state has the task to enforce private law. Sovereignty is largely irrelevant: the 
conflict of laws is not a real conflict, because the differences between private laws do not 
reflect clashes of politics; private international law is, in this sense, purely private and 
apolitical. Territory is of primary importance, because private international law answers 
differences between territorial laws; consequently the method of private international law 
is to determine the territorial "seat" of a legal relation, and to apply the (territorial) law in 
force at that place. Finally, citizenship is determined, for private international law 
purposes, through a territorial factor (domicile). 
We can safely say that these four principles are still, by and large, valid in private 
international law. However, all of them are somewhat problematic in globalization. One 
reason may well be that the underlying conception of the state is no longer adequate. 
Jellinek's definition of the state as "organization of sedentary people which has original 
sovereign power" 124 turns out to be inadequate in all of its three elements. 
First, people are no longer sedentary. We witness an enormous increase of mobility, 
partly due to easier modes of transportation, partly through public encouragement ("free 
movement of persons" 125). The state population becomes more hybrid. Second, and for 
somewhat similar reasons, the state territory loses importance - not because it is harder to 
define, but because, in times of transportation and internet, it becomes less relevant. 
Finally, sovereignty becomes relative, not only with regard to other sovereign states, but-
more importantly - with regard to other powerful actors, especially supranational 
organizations, but also private actors like NGOs and multinational corporations. 
These changes effect private international law as well. Some aspects shall just be 
mentioned. For example, not all law is state law anymore. We see a rise both of 
supranational law - the European Union being the prime example - and of non-national 
law, private norm creation. 126 Choice-of-Iaw rules could, theoretically, point to all kinds of 
rules, including non-state rules, 127 but mostly they do not. 128 At the same time, not all 
decision makers are state institutions. For example, arbitrators face choice-of-Iaw 
questions as well. 129 Nevertheless, the sovereign state, both as deciding institution (the 
judge) and as provider of applicable rules, still shapes the discipline's character. 
124 Supra n. 45. 
125 Art. 61-69 EC. 
126 For a criticism from a globalization perspective of Savigny's position on this point (supra n. 56), see 
Gunther Teubner, The King's Many Bodies: The Self-Deconstruction of Law's Hierarchy, 31 Law 
and Society Review 763, 768 (1997). 
127 Michaels (supra n. 55); Michaels (supra n. 63). 
128 Kegel & Schurig (supra n. 37),16-22, see also 109-111 (against application of lex mercatoria). 
129 Thus, choice-of-Iaw rules for (not sovereign) arbitrators are often shaped after judge-focused rules; 
see Dennis Solomon, Das vom Schiedsgericht in der Sache anzuwendende Recht nach dem Entwurf 
eines Gesetzes zur Neuregelung des Schiedsverfahrensrechts, 43 RIW 981-990 (1997). 
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Furthermore, Savigny's dream of a convergence of laws under the bond of Christianity 
has not come true - not only because non-Christian nations have become more numerous 
and important, but also because Christian nations do not, of course, agree on relevant 
issues. This leads to clashes because Savigny's conception of an apolitical private law has 
proved to be an illusion in the 20th century. In fact, Savigny's apolitical character of private 
international law is the one element that came under severe criticism early on. Now we 
seem to be watching a tendency back from a politicized private international law. However, 
this is not a step back to the situation Savigny faced. Savigny's legal system contained 
clearly delimited public and private law spheres within the sovereign state. This state was 
strong in the public sphere, and (deliberately) weak in the private sphere. The political 
school of private international law urged the state to be strong in the private sphere as well. 
This step, radical as it looked, really only meant replacing one state element (territoriality) 
with another (state interests, sovereignty). In other words, the private international law 
process still took place within, and from, the state paradigm. The situation in globalization 
is different: the state is weak again in the private sphere (and beyond), partly from 
deliberation, partly from the pressure of globalization. The privatization of international 
relations, the competition of legal orders - all these are factors that disable the state and 
make its restrictions in the realm of private law more a function of necessity. 
Also, determining a territorial seat becomes difficult in globalization, because 
territoriality has lost much of its meaning. 130 This is due not only to the fact that the 
state's power almost regularly extends "extraterritorially" - the Iraq war as a quasi-
policing project is only the latest, and most obvious, example. Even irrespective of the 
state, territory is difficult to grasp: in the "global village", borders lose significance, 
distances become irrelevant, markets transcend national boundaries, virtual spaces (like 
the internet) come into existence. Private international law can deal with this development 
in the sense that it will always be possible to determine certain territorial connections, but 
it may become questionable whether those connections actually make sense anymore. 
Finally, the personal element is still in dispute. Whether nationality or domicile should 
govern questions of the person is still an open question. 131 Yet the question may be too 
narrow, because it is still connected to state determinants. In a post-national age, peoples' 
identities may have to be determined by more than just their nationality or their domicile, 
and a more adequate private international law might want to take these additional factors 
into account. 
130 For an analysis of territorial jurisdiction under globalization see Ralf Michaels, Territorial 
Jurisdiction after Territoriality, in: Globalisation and Jurisdiction 105-130 (Piet-Jan Slot & Mielle 
Bultennan eds., The Hague: Kluwer, 2004). 
131 Nation und Staat im Intemationalen Privatrecht (supra n. 110); Roman Trips-Hebert, Internationales 
Privatrecht und Globalisierung. Der Einfluss der Globalisierung auf die Ankniipfung des Personal-
statuts im Intemationalen Privatrecht (Wissenschaftlicher Verlag Berlin, 2003). 
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IV. The Statute of Corporations and the Uberseering Decision 
All of these points cannot be proven here. What can be done is to show how they 
influence the Ubersee decision presented in the introduction, and how these changes may 
explain the mentioned "obsolescence of traditional private international law". 
1) The role of the state 
The role of the state necessarily changes within the European Union. We can see this in 
Uberseering in various ways. The most obvious is that the decision is based not on national 
(private international) law, but on European Union law, a supranational law. The relation 
between EU law and national law is in itself a conflict of laws, 132 albeit a special variant -
vertical instead of horizontal- with special conflicts rules - primacy of EU law on the one 
hand, the subsidiarity principle 133 on the other. It tends to be overlooked that Savigny is 
aware of the possibility of such vertical conflicts; he is just not very interested in them. His 
solution is simple: 
"While several laws are subordinate, one to another, the simple rule holds that the law has 
always the preference which has the narrowest sphere of application. The only exception to 
this rule is the case in which the wider law above it contains special provisions of an absolute 
and imperative character". 134 
A footnote invokes the adage "Stadtrecht bricht Landrecht, Landrecht bricht gemein 
Recht". 135 We could translate this into the principle of subsidiarity 136 - and realize that the 
conflicts rule neither captures the primacy ofEU law, nor the complexity of the relation. It 
is understandable, therefore, that the relation between EU and national law is not usually 
conceptualized as a conflict of laws. 
2) Sovereignty and State Interests 
This first aspect has an evident impact on state sovereignty: by transferring parts of their 
sovereignty to the European Union, the member states evidently have lost some of the 
monopoly on regulating their affairs. Yet we can also see a more specific impact on 
sovereignty in the decision. The German company seat principle is not a politically neutral 
conflicts rule, as Savigny might have conceived it; it sets out to ensure that certain 
standards would be upheld by corporations with their effective seat in Germany. 137 The 
132 Christian Joerges, The Challenges of Europeanization in the Realm of Private Law: A Plea for a New 
Discipline, 14 Duke J. of Compo & InCI L. 149 (2003). 
133 Art. 5 EC. 
134 Savigny, VIII System § 347, p. 22. 
135 Id., note (g). For the adage, see Ruth Schmidt-Wiegand, Deutsche Rechtsregeln und Rechtssprich-
wiirter, 220, 310 (Munich: Beck, 1996). In practice (and in court), the principle was not as 
straightforward as it may look on its face; see Peter Oestmann, Rechtsvielfalt vor Gericht, 6 ff. 
and passim (Frankfurt: Klostennann, 2002), with further references. 
136 Art. 5 (2) Ee. 
137 For its history see Bernhard Grossfeld, Zur Geschichte der Anerkennungsproblematik bei Aktienge-
sellschaften, 38 RabelsZ 344-371 (1974). 
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incorporation principle (a fruit of the first wave of globalization 138), on the other hand, 
gives the founders of a corporation the effective freedom to choose the applicable law. It 
represents, therefore, a (deliberate) restraint of the state. By effectively declaring the 
German company seat principle irreconcilable with EU law, 139 the Court of Justice strips 
the member states of an effective way of regulating corporations with an effective seat in 
their territories. The judgment enables corporations to choose the law applicable to them 
and thereby, so it is hoped, enables a regulatory competition between the member 
states. 140 
Regardless of whether one favors or abhors such regulatory competItIOn, It IS an 
undeniable challenge to the classical concept of absolute sovereignty. Not only is the state 
no longer free to decide on the best policies and must instead bow to the pressure of the 
market. Moreover, such a regulatory competition suddenly moves corporations (and even 
individuals) from a subordinate to an equal position. Suddenly, they no longer have to obey 
state laws, but can instead play out one state's laws against the other's. The Europea Union 
disempowers the member state not only vis-a-vis itself, but also vis-a-vis its citizens. It 
thereby enhances a general trend of globalization, the growing power of individuals and 
corporations, especially multinational enterprises, relative to the state. 
Yet Uberseering reveals an odder impact on questions of sovereignty. Effectively, 
Germany is obliged to recognize companies which have, under the law of incorporation, 
fulfilled all requirements. This could be explained by some kind of enforced comity owed 
to other member states, but it is even more reminiscent of the vested rights theory. 
Reminiscence of this theory - which Savigny rejects,141 is not accidental. In fact, a 
collaborator of the rapporteur in the Court of Justice expressly compares the solution in 
Uberseering, as well as an earlier decision 142 to the "Anglo-American theory of vested 
138 See, for the development of general incorporation in the United Kingdom, Henry N. Butler, General 
Incorporation in Nineteenth Century England: Interaction of Common Law and Legislative 
Processes,6 International Review of Law and Economics 169-188 (1986); for the application of 
the incorporation principle to foreign companies, see Dutch West-India Co. v. Henriques van Moses, 
1 Strange 612 = 93 E.R. 733 (1724 K.B.); Albert Farnsworth, The Residence and Domicil of 
Corporations (London, 1939). 
139 See supra n. 15. 
140 Thus the opinion of Advocate General La Pergola in Centros (supra n. 6) no. 20; See Eva-Maria 
Kieninger, Wettbewerb der Rechtsordnungen im Europaischen Binnenmarkt, esp. §§ 5-7, pp. \05-
273 (regulatory competition in corporate law) (Tilbingen: Mohr, 2002); Stefano Lombardo, 
Regulatory Competition in Company Law in the European Community - Prerequisites and Limits 
(Frankfurt et al.: Peter Lang, 2002); after Uberseering, see Horst Eidenmilller, Wettbewerb der 
Gesellschaftsrechte in Europa, 2002 ZIP 2233; Klaus Heine, Regulierungswettbewerb im Ge-
sellschaftsrecht (Berlin, 2003). The argument has now been taken up by Advocate General Alber: 
Opinion of Jan 30, 2003, C-167/01 Kamer van Koophandel en Fabrieken voor Amsterdam v. Inspire 
Art Ltd.; see Peter Behrens, Das Internationale Gesellschaftsrecht nach dem Uberseering-Urteil des 
EuGH und den Schlussantragen zu Inspire Art, 23 IPRax 193 (2003); Matthias Weller, Schein-
auslandsgesellschaften nach Centros, Uberseering und Inspire Art: Ein neues Anwendungsfeld filr 
die Existenzvernichtungshaftung, id. 207. 
141 Supra text accompanying n. 72. 
142 Judgment of Jan 28,1992, C-204/90 Hanns-Martin Bachmann v. Belgian State, [1992] E.C.R. 1-249, 
no. 16. 
141 
rights". 143 This invocation of a mostly discarded theory is somewhat odd. Not only is the 
territorial basis of the vested rights theory missing in Uberseering - there need not be any 
territorial connection to the incorporation state, making the "vesting" a somewhat fleeting 
concept. 144 Moreover, the criticisms Wachter pronounced 145 are not answered. The 
second of these can be overcome: while one state cannot vest rights and then force 
another state to enforce these rights, a superior organization - the European Union -
can. 146 This is not really different from forcing states to enforce each other's judgments. 147 
Yet the first criticism - the circularity of the vested rights approach - remains. Centros is a 
prime example: Denmark is asked to enforce the rights vested in Centros Ltd. under the 
law of England and Wales and therefore apply English law to it; yet these rights are only 
vested provided English law is applicable - a circular argument. Those authors criticizing 
the Court of Justice of circular reasoning are thus reaffirming a criticism that is almost 200 
years old. 
3) De-Territorialization 
The result in Uberseering - the dentise of the effective seat principle - is also a step in 
de-territorialization. From the beginning it has been difficult to establish the territorial 
presence of a company, for the simple reason that companies are creatures of the law with 
no (necessary) physical existence, they exist by the law of its creation. 148 The seat 
principle takes the company's headquarters for the company itself and thereby re-
territorializes the company. The principle ignores, for the purpose of private international 
law, the legal separation between the company and its founders and/or leaders. The 
incorporation principle, on the other hand, does not seek for any territorial connection -
unless one considers the place of registration (if necessary) or the place of a post box (for 
so-called letterbox companies) a relevant territorial connection. Companies are therefore 
accepted to exist, at least before the law, independent from any territorial connection. 
This is not only irreconcilable with classical private international law, but possibly with 
any private international law based on a state paradigm. As long as the state is by necessity 
territorial, such non-territorial aspects pose problems. If a company need not have any 
territorial connection with a state but can effectively choose the law applicable to it, why is 
it confined to state laws in its choice at all? Small states, especially tax havens, are likely to 
cater their company laws to such companies. 149 Why should this be a privilege for states at 
143 Partsch, cited after Markus Rehberg, Internationales Gesellschaftsrecht im 
Wandel: Das Oberseering-Urteil des EuGH und seine Folgen (Tagungsbericht), 23 IPRax 175-
181, 176f. (2002). For a more elaborate analysis, see Michaels (supra n. 19). 
144 The incorporation principle was, however, accepted by the vested rights theory. 
145 Supra n. 72. 
146 Savigny recognized this difference between conflicts within one state, and between laws of different 
states: VIII System § 348, p. 29. 
147 EC Regulation 4412001, Art. 33 (1); U.S. Constitution. Art. IV Sec. I ("Full Faith and Credit"). 
148 Scoles, Hay et al. (supra n. 86), § 23.2, p. 1106 (2000); Daily Mail (supra n. 4), no. 19. 
149 A privilege that may be changing; see Small States, Big Money, The Economist, Sep 23, 2000. For 
negative impacts of globalization, and multi-national corporations, on small ("real") states see 
Dermott McCann, Small States in Globalizing Markets: The End of Economic Sovereignty?, 34 
International Law and Politics 281-297 (2001). 
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all? 150 Ultimately, companies may be able to exist, by and large, outside the law of states. 
This may be desirable to those who do not trust states, but it is precisely for this reason that 
it presents a challenge to a private international law based on a state paradigm. These 
principles may not exist within the European Union, but certainly on a global level. 
4) The Citizenship of Corporations 
This problem may also be phrased in the terminology of citizenship. Centros involves 
Danish citizens who want to found a company that should be active entirely in Denmark. 
The company they found, however, is considered by the Court of Justice to be English. In 
what sense can it be said that such a company - after all a legal person - is a "citizen" of the 
United Kingdom?151 In which sense is Uberseering a Dutch "citizen"? 
The problem is of course that, on the one hand, corporations are not really "citizens" of 
any country, and that on the other, Art. 48 EC requires that companies "be treated in the 
same way as natural persons who are nationals of Member States". The result is a kind of 
"citizenship" that is up for grabs for companies, freely selectable. 152 Selectable citizenship 
is irreconcilable with concepts of 19th century continental law. It certainly does not reflect 
ideas about nationality, which traditionally require a certain allegiance (although some 
small states are now freely giving away nationality rights for a small fee). This makes it 
difficult to speak of the "nationality" of corporations. 153 Yet it is even problematic for the 
less political concept of domicile, although this has been used for corporations 
frequently.154 Of course, Savigny was aware of the manipulability of his concept of 
domicile. 155 But for individuals, changing domicile requires at least a considerable effort 
of moving. Such effort is unnecessary for companies that need only register in a state to 
become "citizens" of that state. If corporations are legal creatures, then they have no 
"domicile" either. In United States Law, citizenship, 156 domicile, 157 and nationality 158 are 
defined through incorporation, but there is the awareness that this is a mere fiction. If 
European Union law accepts, on the one hand, that corporations are "creatures of the law", 
150 For a radical example, see Ralf Michaels, My Own Private Switzerland, 7 ZEuP 197-199 (1999). 
151 See Peter Behrens, Das internationale Gesellschaftsrecht nach dem Centros-Urteil des EuGH, 19 
IPRax 323-33, 326 (1999); Schurig (supra n. 10), 206. 
152 See Ernst Steindorff, Centros und das Recht auf die gtinstigste Rechtsordnung, 54 Juristenzeitung 
(JZ) 1140-1143 (1999); Eva-Maria Kieninger, Niededassungsfreiheit als Rechtswahlfreiheit, 28 
Zeitschrift fUr Unternehmens- und Gesellschaftsrecht (ZGR) 724-749 (1999). 
153 For this reason, the U.S. Supreme Court used to deny the possibility of a corporation's nationality; 
see Herman Walker, Provisions on Companies in United States Commercial Treaties, 50 Am. J. Int'l 
L. 373, 377 f. (1956) with references; but see E. Hilton Young, The Nationality of a Juristic Person, 
22 Harv. L. Rev. 1 (1909); Heinrich Kronstein, The Nationality of International Enterprises, 52 
Colum. L. Rev. 983 (1952); Comment, The "Nationality" of International Corporations Under Civil 
Law and Treaty, 74 Harv. L. Rev. 1429-1451 (1961). See also Kegel & Schurig (supra n. 37), 501: 
"Die juristische Person hat kein Heimatrecht". 
154 Ohio & Mississippi R.R. v. Wheeler, 66 U.S. (1 Black) 286 (1862). 
155 Savigny, VIII System § 346, p. 17. 
156 U.S. CA. § 1332(c); see James W. Moore & Donald T. Weckstein, Corporations and Diversity of 
Citizenship: A Supreme Court Fiction Revisited, 77 Harv. L. Rev. 1426 (1964). 
157 Johnson & Johnson v. Picard, 282 F.2d 386 (6th Cir. 1960). 
158 Scoles, Hay et al. (supra n. 86) § 23.2, p. 1105 n. 8. 
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but on the other hand requires them to be treated like nationals of the member states -
individuals - this mix creates problems. 
v. Conclusion 
Of course, determining the law applicable to corporations is not a problem brought 
about by globalization; it has existed as long as corporations have. Nothing new under the 
sun, therefore? It seems by contrast that the particular constellation of the private 
international law of corporations within the European Union reveals several problems 
for classical private international law, when faced with challenges that are, even if not 
always new, characteristic of globalization. 
It appears from the foregoing that traditional private international law, if not necessarily 
"obsolete", is at least ill-equipped for globalization. It also appears probable that the 
problems stem from the field's intimate connection with the state, a connection that 
becomes problematic once the state's role in the world changes. Does that mean that 
traditional private international law is a dying species? Or can the discipline be adapted to 
the new challenges? Is it possible to supplant sovereignty, territory, and citizenship with 
factors that are adequate for globalization? It is not within the scope of this paper to 
explore these possibilities. Yet it is likely that such changes will be necessary if the 
discipline is to remain relevant in the future. 
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